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PROFESSOR RICHARDS' UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SOME PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS
Richard B. Saphire*
The relationship of moral philosophy to the understanding and
development of constitutional law has, until recently, been a relatively
neglected issue. Although less evident in contemporary cases in the
United States Supreme Court,I scholarly attention to the congruence
of moral inquiry with the articulation of constitutional values has
become more frequent and intense in recent years. 2 Clearly, the moral
analysis of constitutional values is often demanding for the lawyer and
judge. 3 But even though the use of moral reasoning and adaptation of
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Ohio
State University, 1967; J.D., Salmon P. Chase College of Law, 1971; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 1975.
I wish to express my appreciation to Janice Beers, Kristy Christen, Mark
Donatelli, Jack Grove, Elizabeth Hampel, David Heier, Patricia Heier, Jose Lopez,
Trienah Meyers, Garry O'Donnell, Thomas Reid, Jeffrey Silverstein, and Harriet L.
Turney, who, as students in my Advanced Constitutional Law Seminar, have substantially contributed to my sensitivity to and appreciation of the matters discussed in this
essay. I, of course, assume sole responsibility for its inadequacies.
1. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

2. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); D.A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977).

See also, Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Perry, Abortion, the
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976); Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and ConstitutionalAdjudication,
11 GA. L. REV. 1069 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Search for Legitimacy]; Richards, Unnatural Acts and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORD. L.
REV. 1281 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Right to Privacy]; Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 111 (1978). But see Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 22-39 (1978).
3. See, Michelman, supra note 2 at 1005, where, in suggesting how a judge might
integrate moral theory into deciding a case where an impoverished litigant asserts a
claim to state-provided housing by appealing to inconclusive constitutional texts, Professor Michelman writes:
Let us further suppose that the judges are intuitively drawn to recognition of the
claim. Their considered judgments tend to confirm it. They are, moreover, conversant with a body of speculative moral theory supporting the claim, which they
find persuasively justified by the kind of coherence already described.
Nevertheless, we may expect to find the judiciary reluctant to determine
whether the claimed right to adequate housing exists and is to be enforced if
necessary by judicial mandate.
Id. at 1005. To some extent, the judge's reluctance is premised upon the "intellectual
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the values it describes and reveals to constitutional cases is not uncontroversial, 4 it is an inevitable aspect of the process of interpreting a
document which, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, was "intend"I
ed to endure for ages to come ...
The essential relationship of moral philosophy to constitutional
law is most recently described and advanced by Professor David A.J.
Richards in this volume. 6 It is the purpose of this essay to offer some
brief comments concerning the significance of Professor Richards'
complexity that seems bound to attend efforts to justify moral theories, and to derive
specific rights from them by coherence-style argument." Id. at 1009.
The complexity and sophistication of moral reasoning as it relates to the development of constitutional doctrine is perhaps best illustrated by the task of Professor
Dworkin's mythical, super human judge Hercules. Hard Cases in R. DWORKIN, supra
note 2, at 81-130. The immense difficulty in performing this task had led some of
Dworkin's critics to question the utility of his work. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Policy,
Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1043 (1977).
4. Aside from the extreme intellectual demands associated with moral
philosophy, and the fact that few lawyers and judges are trained as philosophers, it has
been noted that moral reasoning creates certain perceived tensions with the overriding
concerns of legitimacy associated with judicial review.
But the kind of reasoning that is involved in the arguments of contemporary
moral philosophers proceeds from principles or conclusions it is felt the reader is
likely already to accept to other conclusions or principles he might not previously
have perceived as related in the way the writer suggests. Surely, this is reasoning,
for reasoning in other areas consists in nothing more. But note the critical appeal
at the outset to acceptance of the initial proposition or conclusion: the inference
thus proceeds, as it must, from one "ought" to another. We have learned once
again that we can reason about moral issues, but it would be a mistake to carry
that lesson to the point of supposing that reasoning about ethical issues is the
same as discovering absolute ethical truth. So we're where we were: our society
eoes not, rightly does not, accept the notion of a discoverable and objectively
valid set of moral principles, certainly not a set that can govern the issues that
divide our elected officials from their detractors.
Ely, supra note 2, at 31-32 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 22-32. The implications
of Professor Ely's observations are clear: moral values are viewed as inherently subjective and therefore controversial; in a democratic society, controversial judgments
about morality are often thought to be properly confined to the elected representatives
of the people, not to an unelected, and presumably unresponsive, judiciary. For
further elaboration of this theme, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977);
Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Constitutional Interpretivism). For a contrasting approach, see,
e.g., Constitutional Cases in R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 131-49; Saphire, supra note
2, at 177-82; Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic SocietyJudicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). For examples of
contemporary assertions of the essential role of moral argument in constitutional
analysis, see Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454-62 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id.,
462-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 402-08 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at
149.
6. Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of
Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation. 4 U. DAY. L. REV. 295 (1979).
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thesis and to suggest several questions which that thesis raises for further attempts on the part of rights theorists to complete the bridge between moral philosophy and constitutional theory.7
I.

RICHARDS, CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

Professor Richards aptly describes the objectives of constitutional
theory as including: providing an explanation for the ways and forms
in which constitutional doctrine has historically developed; establishing
and articulating "a critical normative viewpoint in terms of which
historic and contemporary forms of constitutional doctrine may be
assessed;" and providing a satisfactory accommodation between the
need for both stability and change in constitutional law. 8 Using the
jurisprudence of rights as the vehicle by which we are to better
"understand the historic and contemporary mission of constitutional
law in the United States," ' Richards employs a distinction between
"concepts" and "conceptions" 1 in an effort to explain how the concept of human rights can provide a normative backdrop for the
development of constitutional doctrines consistent with the "moral
legitimacy of constitutionalism."" Moreover, the concept of human
rights is to provide a basis for achieving a desirable balance between
often competing values of stability and change.12
The idea of the relevancy of a distinction13 between concepts and
conceptions in constitutional law has most recently been developed by
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. In A Theory of Justice, 4 Rawls
wrote:
7. The ideas sketched in this essay are intended to be merely suggestive of the
problems and potential inherent in the development of a theory of rights which can
both describe and justify a constitutional methodology with the normative value
associated with Professor Richards' notion of "human rights as the unwritten Constitution." Id. at 300-01. I intend to more fully address the matter of the appropriate
relationship between moral philosophy, judicial review and constitutionalism in a
forthcoming article.
8. Id. at 296.
9. Id. (footnote omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 299.
12. For a recent discussion of how a theory of rights incorporating the notion of
human dignity can not only accommodate, but also be justified in terms of, stability
and change, see Saphire, supra note 2, at 185-92.
13. It has been noted that the theoretical distinction between concepts and conceptions may be incomplete without some attempt to explore the distinction's validity
in terms of logical theory and the philosophy of language. Munzer & Nickel, Does the
Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1039 n.46
(1977).
14. J.RAWLS, supra note 2.
Published by eCommons, 1979

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for
what is just and unjust is usually in dispute. Men disagree about which
principles should define the basic terms of their association. Yet we may
still say, despite this disagreement, that they each have a conception of
justice. . . Thus it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as
distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being specified by
the role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in common."'
For Rawls, some agreement in conceptions of justice was one of the
prerequisites for a viable human community. Dworkin has attempted
to adapt this dichotomy more directly to American constitutional
theory by arguing that the framers of our constitution intended,
through such broad terms as equal protection, due process, and cruel
and unusual punishment, to address themselves to broad and flexible
standards-i.e., concepts. It was not their intention to impose their
particular views of, say, equality or cruelty upon subsequent generations. Instead, the concepts embodied in the most important, morally
significant constitutional provisions were intended to set out broad
standards to provide touchstones to which subsequent generations
would be expected to refer for direction. But that direction was not intended to be specific or, in the literal sense, determinative. It was to
provide a basis from which to develop new, more relevant conceptions
of equality, cruelty, etc. Although these fresh conceptions may be different from the particular conceptions the framers themselves may
have had, they are (and must be) ultimately capable of being embraced
within, and justified in terms of, the concepts which the framers
established. 16 As Dworkin explained: "Once this distinction is made it
seems obvious that we must take what I have been calling "vague"
constitutional clauses as representing appeals to the concepts they
7
employ, like legality, equality, and cruelty."'
In deciding such constitutional cases as those raising the legality of
capital punishment:
It would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the fact
that when the (cruel and unusual punishment) clause was adopted capital
punishment was standard and unquestioned. That would be decisive if
the framers of the clause had meant to lay down a particular conception
of cruelty, because it would show that the conception did not extend so
far. But it is not decisive of the different question the Court now faces,
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
Constitutional Cases in R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 132-37.
Id. at 135. As to the "obviousness" of this conclusion, compare id. with, R.
BERGER, supra note 4.
15.
16.
17.
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which is this: Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the
concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make death
cruel? "
Employing this analysis, the Supreme Court has very important flexibility in its generally assumed obligation to decide what the framers
intended (or, at least, in light of what they intended). Thus: "But in
fact the Court can enforce what the Constitution says only by making
up its own mind about what is cruel ... ",9
Professor Richards employs this distinction between concepts and
conceptions for use in his constitutional theory2" in "suggesting how
the philosophical analysis of the concept of human rights enables us to
understand the way in which human rights have been articulated in
general, and enforced as constitutional rights in particular." 2' The
operative concept in American constitutionalism is human rights,
which has been most recently, and persuasively, described as embracing two major features: "the capacities of personhood, sometimes called autonomy, and equality." 22 Although the human rights concept is
admittedly "highly abstract and general," it can be more clearly described and explicated by attending to, and accounting for, "shifting or
changing conceptions" of the concept. By observing the battleground
upon which these conceptions clash,2 3 we can more adequately piece
together the component parts of the underlying (or overarching) concept. Ultimately, this concept will provide a common ground for
18. Constitutional Cases in R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 135-36 (emphasis
added).
19. Id. at 136. In the first of the important capital punishment cases of this
decade, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Dworkin's analysis received varying
degrees of implicit recognition in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. at 418 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (relying heavily upon "clear evidence" that the framers intended no absolute bar on the Government's authority to impose capital punishment); id. at 238
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (although placing heavy reliance upon the fact that the death
penalty was accepted at the time of the framing, conceding that the eighth
amendment's notion of cruelty was not completely static); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring, quoting Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1782 (1970)) (insisting that the framers' awareness and
perhaps even acceptance of the practice of capital punishment was not dispositive, and
that they did not envision "so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights").
20. Richards has previously explored this distinction in his impressive attempt to
explicate and defend a "contractarian theory of constitutional law" which claims to
reconcile the institution of judicial review with constitutional democracy founded upon
principles of justice. D.A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 44-56 (1977).
21. Richards, supra note 6, at 296.
22. Id at 297 (footnotes omitted).
23. The battleground on which the various (and infinite?) conceptions compete is
composed of several arenas, which include the courts, the legislatures, and presumably
the streets.
Published by eCommons, 1979
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understanding and integrating the full meaning of various constitutional guarantees. Moreover, the concept of human rights will provide
a moral framework to which positive law should ultimately be made to
account.
II. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IDENTIFYING AND
EVALUATING ITS CONCEPTIONS AND GIVING IT SUBSTANCE.
Professor Richards' utilization of the concept-conception distinction has certain descriptive and normative appeal. Descriptively, it supplies a basis for accounting for the frequent shifts in constitutional
doctrine. Thus, Plessy v. Ferguson,2" upholding racially separate but
25
equal schools can be reconciled with Brown v. Board of Education,
holding that separate schools, even though "equal," were unconstitutional; Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 6 holding that Negroes, free or slave,
were not United States citizens, can be engulfed by the fourteenth
amendment, which even those who disparage the concept-conception
2
distinction admit was intended to confer Negro citizenship. " Similarly,
Goldberg v. Kelly,2 8 holding that due process requires a predeprivation hearing as a condition for revocation of welfare benefits
3
9
can be reconciled with Mathews v. Eldridge" and its progeny, " which
denigrate the importance of prior notice and hearing, and Mapp v.
Ohio,3' strongly pointing to the exclusionary rule as a personal constitu32
tional right can be compared more honestly with Stone v. Powell,
strongly pointing in the other direction.
In a normative sense, Richards' analysis has similar appeal. It
allows one who is dissatisfied with existing constitutional doctrine to
consider more hospitably a principle which does not comport with
one's own conception of the underlying concept (whether human
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
27. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 44, 256 n.33.
28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
29. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
30. For a more comprehensive analysis of Mathews and its progeny, see Saphire,
supra note 2.
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The contrasting cases cited in the text are only meant to
be illustrative of the potential explanatory power of the concept-conception distinction. Any other sharply contrasting cases might also do. Compare, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
discussed in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-55 (1978), and Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), as discussed in Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations

of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/5
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rights or otherwise). Thus, for example, even without the remedial effect of a constitutional amendment, those who were unhappy with the
abortion decisions3" can regard them as less than the absolute and final
(quasi-constitutional?) word on the subject-i.e., as manifesting the
temporal supremacy of one competing conception over another: after
all, it wasn't the framers' concept the Court was articulating.", In this
respect, conceding that ideas of equality and personhood do change, 3"
and explaining and justifying that evolutionary notion through the
mechanism of the concept-conception distinction, can indeed provide a
distinct advantage to constitutional rights theorists.3" Past, present,
and future constitutional doctrine which seems hostile to the overarching values of personhood, equality, etc., can be evaluated in terms
of congruence with the underlying values of human rights.
Placing aside for the moment the apparently inherent transiency of
conceptions, we might still hold Richards accountable for providing a
description of the human rights concept which can be used as a standard for evaluating competing conceptions. In addressing this issue,
Richards responds in two ways. First, we are told that human rights
has been explicated in recent moral theory in terms of the notions of
"personhood, sometimes called autonomy, and equality."" Next,
we
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
34. This attitude may have been somewhat substantiated in post-Roe decisions.
See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); but
see Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W. 4094 (1979).
35. One can't help but be reminded of Justice Douglas' statement that "[n]otions
of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). A more recent
representation of this notion can be found in Justice Blackmun's statement in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 405 (1978), that "the Fourteenth
Amendment has expanded beyond its original 1868 conception and now is recognized
to have reached a point where, as Mr. Justice Powell states, it embraces a 'broader
principle.'
36. The concept-conception vehicle can also present considerable risks for the sort
of morality in constitutional law which Richards clearly desires. Some of these risks,
and some preliminary problems associated with his employment of the vehicle, will be
addressed in Section III, infra.
37. Richards, supra note 6, at 297 (footnote omitted). The notion that autonomy
and equality, along with respect, fraternity and dignity, constitute the core values of a
just society is one commonly utilized by rights theorists. Thus, Professor Dworkin
writes:
The institution of rights against the government is not a gift of God, or an
ancient ritual, or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that
makes the Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and
more expensive, and it would be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served
some point. Anyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our
Government for respecting them, must have some sense of what that point is. He
must accept, at the minimum, one or both of two important ideas. The first is the
vague but powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, associated with Kant, but
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are told that "the normative centrality of human rights remains-the
idea, at a minimum, that the moral legitimacy of state power rests on a
reciprocal balance of allegiance to the state by the citizen and respect
38
by the state of certain uncompromisable rights of the citizen."
Although these descriptions may be useful-expressing at least the intuitive notions that we might hold about what the idea of "human
rights" involves-there is some question as to whether they adequately
(if not fully) define the core meaning and parameters of the underlying
concept. And I do not mean to focus exclusively on linguistic problems. 39 Even recognizing the enormously complex and demanding task
defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that there are ways of
treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the
human community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust.
The second is the more familiar idea of political equality. This supposes that
the weaker members of a political community are entitled to the same concern and
respect of their government as the more powerful members have secured for
themselves....
R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 198-99. See also Karst, supra note 2 (essence of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is principle of equal citizenship embodying
the right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible and participating member); Saphire, supra note 2 (suggesting that the notion of "inherent
dignity" underlies the due process clauses).
38. Richards, supra note 6, at 301.
39. I have elsewhere suggested that further and fresh insights into the concept of
human dignity might be promoted through both the clarification and refinement of
traditionally utilized language and the application of new vocabulary. Saphire, supra
note 2, at 159 n.214.
The linguistic problem referred to in the text is one which is too frequently ignored
by moral philosophers and constitutional theorists alike. The problem might be appropriately illustrated in the following terms:
The particular experience that we started with has now been widened so as to embrace all possible impressions or images that sentient beings have formed or may
form of the house in question. This first simplification of experience is at the bottom of a large number of elements of speech, the so-called proper nouns, or
names of single individuals or objects. It is, essentially, the type of simplification
which underlies, or forms the crude subject of, history and art. But we cannot be
content with this measure of reduction of the infinity of experience. We must cut
to the bone of things, we must more or less arbitrarily throw whole masses of experience together as similar enough to warrant their being looked
upon-mistakenly, but conveniently-as identical. This house and that house and
thousands of other phenomena of like character are thought of as having enough
in common, in spite of great and obvious differences of detail, to be classed under
the same heading. In other words, the speech element "house" is the symbol, first
and foremost, not of a single perception, nor even of the notion of a particular
object, but of a "concept," in other words, of a convenient capsule of thought
that embraces thousands of distinct experiences and that is ready to take in
thousands more. If the single significant elements of speech are the symbols of
concepts, the actual flow of speech may be interpreted as a record of the setting of
these concepts into mutual relations.
Sapir, Language Defined, in EXPOSITION AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 103, 109-10 (J.
Sanderson & W. Gordon ed. 1969).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/5
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of describing and defining abstract moral ideas, ° the viability and
practicality of the concept-conception distinction as a vehicle for importing moral philosophy into constitutional law depends upon the
care with which the operative concepts are described. 4 ' One can concede the defects and limitations associated with Herbert Wechsler's
"neutral principles," as Richards does, but the concept-conception approach is used by Richards to legitimize judicial review by showing
that it is the framers' concepts (albeit elucidated by our conceptions)
which count.4 ' And although concepts are not likely to be morally
"neutral," they must ultimately be reducible to some articulatable
core
substance. As Richards has noted elsewhere:
The argument thus can forcefully be made that the proper moral interpretation of the constitutional order would emphasize the concept of justice embodied in the Constitution as developed by subsequent amendments, not the historically limited conception of justice
of the country's founders. The Constitution was intended to have
long historical durability; truth to its spirit requires that the underlying philosophy and concept be preserved, not fidelity to antique

and indefensible specific conceptions which, had the founders been
alive today they would have rejected outright.' 3
Accordingly, at some point in Richards' scheme, the courts must explain and justify today's constitutional principles in terms of yesterday's conceptual values. Courts can and should be evaluated by how
40.

Important efforts in this direction are made in D.A.J.

RICHARDS,

supra note

20. See also, J. RAWLS, supra note 2.
41. Justifiably or not, Professor Dworkin's use of the concept-conception distinction has been extensively criticized because of the suspicion that vague and abstract
concepts can be twisted-i.e., they can mean all things to all people. See, e.g.,
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1038 n. 116; Nickel, Dworkin on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA.L. REV. 1115 (1977); Note, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", 74
MICH. L. REV. 1167 (1976). Cf. ConstitutionalInterpretivism, supra note 4; R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 241 (1975):
[A~ll the many attempts to build a moral and political doctrine upon the conception of a universal human nature have failed. They are repeatedly trapped in a
dilemma. Either the allegedly universal ends are too few and abstract to give content to the idea of the good, or they are too numerous and concrete to be truly
universal. One has to choose between triviality and implausability.
42. Richards, supra note 6, at 295; Search for Legitimacy, supra note 2, at
1082-89; D.A.J. Richards, supra note 20, at 43-44. For a recent critique of neutral
principles by a constitutional theorist whose reservations with Richards' approach are
no doubt greater than my own, see Ely, supra note 2, at 32-33. See also Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973)
(footnote omitted): "A neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a
joy forever. But if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special,
it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it."
43. See D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 53 (emphasis added); Richards, Book
Review, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 310, 317-18 (1978).
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successfully they perform this task." Ultimately, our ability to evaluate
depends upon the certainty and clarity with which the seminal concepts
are described. It is up to Richards to translate "autonomy" and
"equality" into more concise, manageable, and intelligible terms. 5
44. In the nomenclature of some contemporary constitutional theorists, the processes generally adopted by the courts in constitutional adjudication are often fit into
one of two categories-interpretivism and non-interpretivism. The interpretivists, most
commonly identified with Justice Black, are said to confine themselves closely to the
norms and values specifically stated in or very clearly implicit from the text. The noninterpretivist is said to feel free to go beyond these sources in search of broader norms
or values. See generally Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 4; Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). Richards' analysis is
clearly "non-interpretivist," and he apparently adopts Professor Grey's notion of an
unwritten constitution. Richards' approach requires, as does Grey's, that at some
point we are able to understand with some degree of precision exactly what "basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment," id. at 706, are embodied in the
human rights concept. See also, Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 117 (1978), so that we may test competing conceptions
against them. In this respect, weighing claims of individual rights in terms of "a
reciprocal balance of allegiance to the state by the citizen and respect by the state of
certain uncompromisable rights of the citizen" will simply not do. Richards, supra
note 6, at 301. See also note 43 infra.
45. This task may also have practical importance for the potential realization of a
human rights ideal capable of being invoked with confidence and effectiveness by the
judiciary. As Professor Michelman has argued, a court capable of perceiving and
understanding the moral concepts underpinning a just social order may nevertheless be
reluctant to incorporate them into constitutional doctrine unless they can be described
in ways which those of us who are less sophisticated can understand. Michelman, supra
note 2, at 1007.
I do not mean to argue for a view that moral philosophy is worthless for constitutional theory unless it can be broken down into simple and uncontroversial words and
phrases. It is apparent that such a prospect is terribly unlikely and somewhat naive. To
be sure, notions of equality, autonomy and dignity are, to some extent, inherently and
endemically abstract. See Saphire, supra note 2, at 115-25. What does seem clear,
however, is that the moral philosopher who purports to advance a theoretical construct
with significant potential for being understood and invoked by courts must translate
that construct into terms which are clear enough for those courts to synthesize and explain to the unenlightened: "We seem to be saying that a decision which, once truly
understood, would not popularly and genuinely be felt to be repugnant on its merits,
may nevertheless be unacceptable because it is destined not to be understood."
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1007. That this point constitutes more than pedestrian nitpicking is illustrated by the recent remark of one of our most respected constitutional
scholars and jurists, Judge Friendly. Alluding to the Hart-Dworkin debate, he wrote:
"I wish to remain aloof both because the debate is being carried on with such vigor
and at such length, . . . and because of my own deficiencies. In jurisprudential controversies of this sort I tend to agree with whomever I have read last." Friendly, The
Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24 n.14
(1978) (citations omitted).
In this regard, and with considerable respect for the magnitude of the task and Professor Richards' credentials and writings, I look forward to a more detailed development of the concept of human rights in his subsequent writings. That he has recognized this responsibility and has taken it seriously has been reflected in some of those
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Although this task may be formidable, Richards reveals a major
consideration which both facilitates and impedes our ability to appreciate the contours of the concept of human rights. Recognizing the
nagging abstractness and generality of the concept, he concludes that it
is best understood in terms of "battles over conflicting conceptions of
the underlying concept. . . .'"I Thus, the road to clarity and concreteness is marked by both the corpses of defeated conceptions and
the flags of those that have proved victorious. The underlying concept,
"while implicit in constitutional interpretation in general" will appear
"dramatically and expressly" 7 through the articulation of particular
conceptions in constitutional cases.
This analysis raises several problems. First, it leaves us waiting for
the ultimate evolution of all (or more) relevant conceptions before we
are able to describe the underlying concept adequately enough to use it
as a standard to test, prospectively, the validity of new (and perhaps
hotly contested) conceptions. By its own terms, the analysis leaves us
with the underlying notions of equality and autonomy as implicated in
the decision in a particular case, but promises that those notions are
destined to be expanded, contracted, modified, etc., in future cases."'
Second, Richards' approach does not tell us how prior conceptions are
to be integrated into or related to the human rights concept in its currently understood form. To the extent that yesterday's conception
loses in the battleground of today's constitutional case, does it become
incorporated into the fabric of the concept, giving us a deeper
writings, see Right to Privacy, supra note 2; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity
Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Free Speech]; Richards, Equal Opportunityand School Financing:
Towards a Moral Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Opportunityand School Financing];and in his forthcoming
works. See, e.g., Richards, Rights and Autonomy: A Prolegomenon to the Theory of
Rights, to be published in HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.; Richards, Commercial Sex and
the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, to be published in U. PA. L. REV.; Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:A Case Study in Human Rights, to be published in HASTINGS
L.J.
46. Richards, supra note 6, at 299.
47. Id. at 301. Elsewhere, Richards had described this evolving notion of clarity
in the overarching constitutional concepts as follows: "[T]he Constitution embodies a
general conception of justice-that is, certain fundamental rights derived from the
contractarian model are to be immune from majoritarian political bargaining, but the
specific form these rights will take is to evolve as circumstances and social theory
change." Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 1316 n.186. Constitutional rights, then, are
defined in terms of changes "in specific conceptions required by the values of the
general conception of liberty embodied in the constitutional order." Id.
48. For further implications of this problem, see infra, Section IV-(i).
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understanding of its essence, or is it ejected from the concept's core,
9
providing a lesson to a future court that decisions can be mistaken?"
III. ACCOMMODATING STABILITY AND CHANGE THROUGH
CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS: WHAT ROLE DOES HISTORY PLAY?

These problems, and others, associated with Richards' analysis
may be unavoidable in view of his employment of the conceptconception distinction. To further understand the significance and implications of his methodology, it is useful to examine the reasons for
his use of this distinction and what appear to be some of its inherent
limitations.
In this connection, it is important to consider the objectives which
Richards contends a constitutional theory must serve:
The tasks of constitutional theory appear.., to be both explanatory and
normative, concerned with both understanding and recommendations for
change. These tasks are, at a minimum: first, some explanation for the
historic forms of constitutional doctrine; second, articulation of a critical
normative viewpoint in terms of which historic and contemporary forms
of constitutional doctrine may be assessed; and third, some account for
0
both the stabilities and changes in constitutional law.
The jurisprudence of (human) rights, therefore, sets as a primary goal,
the establishment of a clarification and accommodation of the "problem of stability and change in constitutional law."'" The conceptconception vehicle is adopted because of its potential to explain
judicial involvement in the shaping of previously unrecognized (or unaccepted) constitutional rights, free from the accusations of legislative
creativity. Through utilization of this vehicle, a judge can explain (or
defend) the development of new constitutional principles in historic
terms. Thus, such rights as the right of choice in the abortion
3
decision, 2 the right to private, consensual sexual preference, the
49. If today's losing contestant in the battle of conceptions is one which had
previously been victorious and incorporated into the concept's core, courts may be
confronted with a real dilemma in understanding the content of the concept in its current state as it relates to deciding tomorrow's case. If a losing conception is to always
be excluded from subsequent interpretations of the concept's meaning (i.e., the
separate but equal doctrine can never emerge victorious again, see Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), the court is given clearer guidance than where the losing conception is to
sometimes be absorbed, but sometimes not. In the latter event, Richards might want to
develop some theory of mistake which would provide guidance in determining the effect of overruling. Cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 2.
For a further discussion of this point, see infra, Section IV-(iii).
50. Richards, supra note 6, at 296.
51. Id.

52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. In arguing for a constitutional right to engage in private, consensual sexual
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right to receive and possess "obscene" communciations," 4 and the
right to equal educational opportunity requiring equal expenditures in
state financing of schools," are validated. In recognizing these rights,
the Supreme Court can freely admit that abortion, homosexuality,
pornography, and equal school expenditures (and integrated public
schools) were not included in the conceptions of justice held by the
framers and still conclude that, insofar as they represent today's conceptions, they are consistent with the human rights concept the framers
accepted. The question of the legitimacy of this approach to judicial
review is answered by the assertions that: (1) the constitution was intended to be flexible enough to endure; (2) "truth to its spirit" is maintained through adherence to its "underlying philosophy and concept";
and (3) constitutional fidelity is measured according to congruence of
today's principles with the framers' concepts, not "antique and indefensible specific conceptions."6
But the concept-conception approach may prove to be both too
much and too little in terms of its adaptability to accommodate stability
and change in a moral constitutional order. Because each new conception must be reconciled with a pre-existing concept of the framers, the
analysis incorporates an inherently conservative bias. For any new
right to be eligible for entry into constitutional doctrine, it must be tied
to historical origins. Instead of history being used as a source for
guidance and direction, it becomes the ultimate litmus paper of constitutional validity. For Richards, "taking history seriously" requires
more than a recognition that "[c]onstitutional law is an historical artifact and a product of a certain society."" Although defensible conactivity free from state interference (and thus against the Court's summary affirmance
of a state conviction for engaging in homosexual activity in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'd mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court)) Richards writes:
Contractarian moral theory affords a solid intellectual and moral foundation for
both the method of reasoning employed in inferring the constitutional right to
privacy, and the specific right there recognized and later developed ....

In this

regard, the Court has correctly understood that its role in the constitutional order
is to preserve certain durable concepts of justice which are to act as constraints on
majoritarian political bargaining. The moral values underlying the constitutional
order are specified by the concept of justice [manifested in the idea of human
rights] and its associated principles ....

The specific applications of these prin-

ciples may require change over time. To the extent this is so, the Court, in order to
maintain fidelity to constitutional values, must adjust its interpretation of constitutional provisions in order to ensure that justice is done in the way that fundamental constitutional principles require.
Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 1316 (footnote omitted).
54. See Free Speech, supra note 45.
55. See Equal Opportunity and School Financing, supra note 45.
56. D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 53.
57. Richards, supra note 6, at 303.
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stitutional theory may well demand the facilitation of "historical
reconstructions of the ways of thinking which led earlier controversialists of various competing conceptions to take the views they in fact
took,"" Richards' analysis comes closer than he seems to admit to
shackling us to notions of morality which, although perhaps held by
the framers, are no longer relevant today. Granting Richards' assertion
that "a constitutional theory is richer and more explanatory to the ex9 a constitutional theory
tent that it has more historical resonances,"
must have more than historical resonances to be viable." Professor
Michelman's observation illustrates this point:
58. Id. at 299.
59. Id. at 300. Richards has written that "the moral theory underlying the Constitution should not be limited to the kinds of moral rights that the country's founders regarded as fundamental." D.A. J. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 51. In describing the appeal of a
contractarian theory of constitutional law, he noted that the framers endorsed some
moral theory regarding the moral rights of human beings akin to that developed by
Milton, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, and that, right or wrong, that theory is a central
part of our practice of constitutional law. Id. at 44. He cautioned that, like it or not,
"the choice to adopt or reject such a theory is not an open question in the United
States; it is part of the warp and woof of the constitutional design." Id. at 44-45. That
he finds difficulty in viewing history as dispositive as that is evidenced by his (posthumous) addition of John Rawls to the list of political philosophers whose moral
theory the framers (would have?) adopted. In this respect, Richards might be accused
of "wanting his cake and eating it too." One is reminded of (although not necessarily
persuaded by) Professor Ely's recent reaction to Professor Dworkin's argument for a
Rawlsian notion of constitutional law:
The invitation to judge seems clear: seek constitutional values in (that is, overrule
political officials on the basis of) the writings of good contemporary moral
philosophers, in particular the writings of Rawls ....

But how are the judges to

react to this invitation when virtually all the commentators on Rawls' work, and
there have been many-sensitive, informed philosophers and lawyers, whose good
faith there is no particular reason to doubt-have expressed serious reservations
about Rawls' conclusions? The Constitution may follow the flag, but is it really
supposed to keep up with the New York Review of Books?
Ely, supra note 2 at 37 (footnote omitted).
60. See, e.g., tenBroek, Use by the United States Surpeme Court of Extrinsic
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 410-13 (1939).
Although an alternative account of the appropriate role of history in constitutional
adjudication is beyond the scope of this essay, the inherent difficulty of a constitutional methodology which places unavoidable and dispositive weight on past events is
suggested in the following view:
What then is the meaning of history? ...

History has no meaning, in the sense of

a clear pattern or determinate plot; but it is not simply meaningless or pointless. It
has no certain meaning because man is free to give it various possible meanings.
His freedom is sharply limited of course. Man has to choose within the conditions imposed by his biological structure, his natural environment, and his cultural
heritage. He cannot do whatever he has a mind to, and at that his mind has been
largely made up by his ancestors. For such reasons he is always prone to believe
that history somehow makes itself, in spite of his efforts, by the automatic operation of natural laws or God's will. Still, at any moment he has a wide range of
choices and is willy-nilly making more history, discovering the meanings of his
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/5
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Why do we or should we try to reconstruct what the framers had
specifically in mind, in the course of deciding what we are now to make
of the texts they wrote? Is it not because we think that in the process of
attempting such reconstruction we shall often encounter clues and
reminders of principles and notions (perhaps the only principles and notions) which can set those texts in coherent and comprehensible relation
to one another and to the whole set of arrangements under which we continue to live, but whose informing ideas we sometimes lose sight of? Insofar as this is our quest, non-historical accounts would seem to have a
competitive claim on our attention, according to their felt explanatory
power. 6'
In this regard, one must recognize the restrictions associated with a
methodology of constitutional interpretation which places dispositive
weight on the framers' intent-even if the intent relates to their concept of justice or human rights. If the catalogue of moral rights endorsed by the framers either does not include a particular right (i.e.,
conception) for which one now wants to argue 2 or appears to expressly
exclude such a right, one must either conceptualize those rights at a
higher level or argue that the framers' intent is irrelevant.6 3 If an attempt is made to more broadly conceptualize, one runs the risk of being able to include every supposed right in the original list, inevitably
weakening the arguments in support of any of them. If the argument
then turns to the supposed irrelevancy of the framers' intent, one's
claim to methodological and constitutional stability (i.e., establishing
the pedigree of a new conception) is seriously weakened. A similar problem confronts an attempt to focus on the framers' "concepts," which
supposedly will reveal their moral and political philosophical commitments.6 ' If the moral philosophy of, e.g., Locke or Rousseau
past and determining the meanings of his future....
This insistence on human freedom is not simply cheering. It means that we
have to keep making history, instead of leaning on it, and that we can never count
on a final solution. It means the constant possibility of foolish or even fatal
choices. Yet the dignity of man lies precisely in his power to choose his destiny.
H. MULLER, THE USES OF THE PAST 80-81 (1952).

61. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1003 n.125.
62. The separate problem of discovering this set of rights with any acceptable
degree of reliability or determinancy is as enormous here, if not more so, than in other
areas where the framers' intent is invoked. See, e.g., Lange, The Speech and Press
Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77 (1975); tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the
United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26
CALIF. L. REV. 287 (1938); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964). But see R. BERGER, supra

note 4.
63. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. This assumes, of course, that all of the framers shared the same political
philosophy, a prospect as unlikely as complete consensus would be among 55 people
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wasn't quite comprehensive enough to logically incorporate a moral
right now asserted against the state, there is a real danger of either
perverting those philosophical theories or supplementing them with
new ones which are now claimed to "better articulate" or "better
describe" earlier understandings. Under this approach, Rawls can be
substituted for his 18th century precursors even though his philosophy
may, in important ways, be distinctive.6" If this is so, tomorrow's
66
philosophers can be substituted for Rawls, and so on.
It should also be noted that attaching the description of "unwritten
constitution" to one's methodology does not necessarily change its
preoccupation with historical justification. For Richards-and
others 6'-the notion of an unwritten constitution is adopted to justify
(or explain) the articulation and enforcement of values which were not
reduced to writing in the text of our constitution. -These unwritten
values, however, are as historically rooted and determined as the written ones.6"
IV.

SOME FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS.

There are more specific difficulties associated with the potential of
Professor Richards' unwritten constitution of human rights to adequately resolve the problem of stability and change in constitutional in(not to mention the ratifying state conventions) on less profound matters. See generally
tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional
Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157 (1939). Moreover, it is not quite clear why the
political philosophy of the 18th century most subscribed to by the framers-even if we
could find unanimity and it focused on Rawls(ian)-should be found determinative in
the case of the 39th Congress which drafted the fourteenth amendment. See Munzer,
Book Review, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 153, 163 (1977).
65. For an analysis of J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), which highlights
points of congruence and departure with Kant, Locke, Rousseau and other
philosophers whose works affected the framers' thinking, see R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS

(1977).

66. Apparently recognizing this problem, Richards has acknowledged the efficacy
of Dean Wellington's remark that "The Fourteenth Amendment, as Holmes has said,
does 'not enact Mr. Herbert -Spencer's Social Statics.' Nor does it enact Mr. John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice," Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 1284 n.17, citing
Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 279-80, 285 (1973). Unfortunately, Richards'
response-'"but contractarian theory does not beckon as a theoretical desideratum extraneous to the constitutional order, it is at its foundation"-is less than convincing.
Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 1284. Granting that the framers were thinking in
contractarian terms, the substance of the contract they were writing should, in
Richards' account, be controlling. It seems clear that they could not have had John
Rawls as a contracts professor.
67. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 44; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 13, at 1042-45.
68. See Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
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terpretation. Many of these appear to be inherent in the conceptconception approach to constitutional theory. I will attempt to point
out some of these difficulties and their implications for Professor
Richards' theory, without here attempting a comprehensive account.
(i) First, and as briefly suggested above, reliance upon the resolution
of controversies between new and competing conceptions of the
underlying concept as a basis for elaboration and clarification of the
concept diminishes the efficacy of human rights as a standard by which
future conduct and relationships may be governed. Although inately
complete, the concept's meaning lies in its ad hoc applications, thus
tending to reduce the "principled" content of such applications, which
Richards has expressly regarded as a necessary ingredient of constitutional law. 9 The less "principled" the application of the human rights
concept, the less fair it becomes," ' resulting in more tension with its
core values of equality and autonomy.
(ii) The operation of the concept-conception analysis may also
prove counter-productive to the core values of human rights in another
way. The proposition that the human rights concept is elaborated
through the battling of conceptions described by Richards,"1 while providing for desired flexibility, suggests that the conceptions themselves
need not be very enduring to be eligible for assimilation to the
concept's inner core. Unless the centrality and concomitant longevity
of eligible conceptions is addressed (if not specified), at least two
problems may arise. First, the conception's consistency with at least
the formal aspect of equality may vary proportionately to its mutability:7" the shorter it lives, the more transient will be the particular constitutional rights it embodies. Second, the more often the Court abandons one conception for another, the more erratic and unprincipled
will its work appear, raising prudential problems for the Court's
capacity to perform its function. 3
(iii) The concept-conception analysis employed by Richards does
not provide adequate criteria for evaluating the conceptions of human
69.
70.

Search for Legitimacy, supra note 2, at 1084.
See generally Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles,

78 COLUM. L. REV. 922 (1978). Cf. Note, Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1167, 1178 (1976).
71. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text, supra.
72. Cf. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299
(Opinion of Powell, J.): "[Tihe mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon
shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its
coherent interpretation."
73.

See generally, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).

Published by eCommons, 1979

Cf.

UNIVERSITY OFDA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

rights which the framers held, nor for accounting for the appropriate
74
weight (if any) we are to accord these conceptions today. Although
we might all agree today that the framers' general acquiescence in or
acceptance of the institution of slavery might be a conception of
equality we can quickly ignore (especially in light of the intervening
fourteenth amendment), their conceptions of permissible punishment
may be more difficult to dismiss out of hand. 5 In this regard, the
specific conceptions held by the framers may be quite important in
shedding light on their concepts. As two recent commentators have
noted: "Ordinarily in interpreting someone's instructions one attends
not only to the concepts used but also to the instructor's intentions and
situation." 6 The conceptions which the framers had of their own concepts can be valuable guides to understanding the concepts themselves.
In any event, Richards needs to develop a theory of conceptions which
provides guidance in tracing and measuring the significance of static or
antiquated conceptions. Assuming that the path from the Warren and
Brandeis conception of privacy" to the right to consensual sexual
preference is as clear as Richards suggests, 8 other paths may be much
more difficult for even him to travel. Moreover, if the framers' (and
later) conceptions are too readily cast aside, one might well "wonder
whether such poverty of the parts is compatible with such richness of
the whole." 7 9
V.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS.

The observations noted in this essay are not intended to detract
from the significance of Professor Richards' attempt to develop a constitutional methodology which adequately accommodates the competing values of stability and change within a moral framework.
Richards' contribution to the development of a viable and durable
constitutional theory is important, and is certain to provide a catalyst
for those who believe that moral philosophy and constitutional law are
inexorably bound together in a partnership which has too frequently
and too easily been ignored. However, Richards' decision not to more
fully explore (although noting the importance of) what "taking history
74. This concern is generally the same as that addressed to Dworkin's use of the
concept-conception distinction, see, supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text, and
Munzer & Nickel, supra note 13, at 1037-41.
75. Note the substantial diversity of opinions among the Justices on this issue in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
76. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 13, at 1040.
77. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
78. Human Rights, supra note 6, at 9-10; also see, Right to Privacy, supra note 2.
79. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 13, at 1041 n.53.
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seriously" means in his article raises important questions concerning
the capacity of his proffered methodology to satisfactorily accommodate the past with the present and future. It would seem that
Richards does not really want to believe that historical choices should
be mechanically accorded dispositive weight in addressing the moral
implications of today's constitutional decisionmaking. Moreover, he
does not appear to think that stability should always be the dominant
factor in the clash between yesterday's values and those of the present
and future. Nor does he seem to suggest that history's exclusive importance to today's constitutional decisions lies in its capacity to defend
those decisions against cries of judicial usurpation of popular
prerogatives, 80 although it certainly may serve this purpose. In fact,
one senses that Richards is struggling with the role of history in constitutional theory, and that he is seeking a more neutral balance between the past, present and future than the methodology proposed in
his article in this volume allows.
It is in this respect that a reexamination of the concept-conception
approach might be in order. As previously suggested, that framework,
as described by Dworkin 8 ' and employed by Richards, assumes that, in
the final analysis, the framers' intent is the be-all and end-all of constitutional law notwithstanding that it is their concepts and not their
conceptions that count. But even granting, as most of our constitutional jurisprudence does, that this assumption in unavoidable, 8" it
80. Those who insist that the Court's ultimate task is to discover the framers'
choice of values and impose them upon us today, regardless of how irrelevant or archaic they might now be regarded, always have the opportunity to say: "We didn't do
it-you did." See Grey, supra note 4, at 705.
But in searching for their value judgments, the numerous and difficult obstacles encountered raise considerable suspicion as to whether the Court really isn't sneaking in
some of its own values on the sly. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 46. And
that claim can come from all directions, Compare, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In any event, the real question which most Justices
and scholars seem to be afraid to take on directly is whether there are not good and
sufficient reasons why the framers' choices (whether they be called concepts or conceptions) ought not to prevail in this case, and whether life-tenured judges must always be
tarred and feathered for saying so. Those that have come closest, see, e.g., L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 453-54, have been vigorously criticized as
ignoring the important political lessons of history. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 2; Ely,
Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451
(1978); Ely, supra note 42.
81. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 134-37.
82. A suggestion that the framers' intent need not always be dispositive (as opposed to persuasive or important) may be taken as blasphemous by most contemporary
constitutional theorists. It is my impression that this may be as much a function of pervasive inattention to the role that history and language play in human thought as it is
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may be better played out through other means. One such alternative,
using Dworkin's definitions,8 3 might be to recast the methodology into
a conceptions-concept, rather than a concept-conceptions, mold,
recognizing the framers' understandings as a series of conceptions
which, when taken together and viewed in the light of subsequent conceptions, reveal an emerging concept which the constitution purports
may be
to symbolize. Pursuant to this model, the framers' intent
4
viewed as controlling, but in more of a symbolic fashion.1
In the final analysis, the analytical model of concepts and conceptions, existing apart from each other but possessing important symbiotic and synergistic characteristics, does serve to account for the inherent dynamicism that even the most cautious have been forced to
concede in constitutional law. 8" While the pace of change thought ap86
propriate in a "living constitution" is subject to debate, there appears to be general consensus that neither stagnation nor constant flux
are desirable states. Professor Richards' "unwritten constitution of
human rights" presents an approach to a moral constitutional regime
which offers continued vitality through a prescription for accommodating stability and change. Although the precise accommodation
he offers is subject to controversy, that he makes a valuable contribution to constitutional theory is not.
of reason and logic. See note 57 supra. That such a view is not necessarily inconsistent
with our understandings of political and constitutional theory will be a subject of my
future writings.
83. See note 75 supra.
84. This conceptions-concept model may be attractive for those concerned with
the conservative bias of the concept-conceptions approach, and it may inject greater
flexibility into the capacity of constitutional values to adequately evolve. On the other
hand, it may tend to replace that conservative bias with a reformative one, a balance
which is no more neutral than that of the model it seeks to supplant. It would therefore
be equally important to describe the weight or function that prior conceptions are to be
given in understanding and assessing the legitimacy of new conceptions. However, this
approach may have the attractive capacity of allowing and inviting us to learn from
history without being chained to it. Put differently, this approach might allow us an
acceptable alternative to Raoul Berger's dichotomy of the "chains of the
Constitution" and "ropes of sand." R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 371
(1977).
85. For examples of the rare exceptions to this proposition, see, e.g., L. HAND,
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1959); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
86. Compare, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, with Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
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